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The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Development of
Mortars
Abstract
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) repeatedly showed itself to be one of the
most inventive and adaptive of all the violent non-state actors who operated in the latter
part of the twentieth century. Among its most innovative exploits was the PIRA’s successful
development and fielding – spanning almost its entire operational lifetime – of improvised
mortar systems. This chapter will trace the sustained development of mortars, including
the underlying motivations for pursuing mortars as a complex engineering effort, the
process by which the development took place and the underpinnings of its success. The
discussion will show that the PIRA’s mortar development program was born out of tactical
necessity but enabled by good organizational practices and the organization’s access to
materials, expertise and places in which to leverage these.
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Introduction
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)1 was viewed by its allies and
adversaries alike as one of the most inventive, innovative, and adaptive of
all the violent non-state actors who operated in the latter part of the
twentieth century.2 During its almost three decades of attacks against
civilians and security forces from 1969 until its last ceasefire in 1998, the
PIRA employed a plethora of means of murder and mayhem, ranging from
small arms (most notoriously the Armalite assault rifle), to rocket-propelled
grenades, flamethrowers, heavier machine guns (such as the M60), and an
almost dizzying array of improvised explosive and incendiary devices.3 The
focus here, however, will be on the PIRA’s successful development and
fielding–spanning almost its entire operational lifetime–of improvised
mortars. Error! Reference source not found. shows the various generations of
mortars that the PIRA developed, from its first highly hazardous and
relatively ineffectual attempts in the early 1970s, to its massive ‘barracks
busters’ of the 1990s. When it comes to judging the success of the PIRA’s
adoption efforts, it is apparent from Error! Reference source not found.that the
PIRA, barely two years after its first tentative attempts,4 succeeded in
producing a reasonably reliable and safe weapon that at least some of the
time resulted in physical damage and casualties, thus achieving a minimal
level of success. Further, by the middle of the 1990s, PIRA mortars were
evaluated as comparable in quality to military models.5
Most importantly for measuring success, the PIRA did launch several mortar
attacks that caused serious injuries or fatalities and some that qualified as
‘spectaculars’.6 Among the more notable mortar attacks were:
For more general information on the PIRA, see Moloney, Ed, A Secret History of the
IRA (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2002), 46-71; also Coogan, Tim P.,
The IRA (New York, NY: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002); and English, Richard
Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
2 Oppenheimer, A.R., IRA: The Bombs and the Bullets, A History of Deadly Ingenuity
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009), 231.
3 See Coogan, The IRA, 431-432; and Oppenheimer, passim, especially pp. 137, 170.
Although never put into practice, the PIRA also reportedly worked on building fuel-air
bombs, torpedoes, GPS-guided car bombs, and its own surface-to-air missiles
(Oppenheimer, IRA, xviii, 9).
4 The interval between the appearance of the Mark 1 mortar (1972) and the far more
effective Mark 6 (1974).
5 Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British
Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 192.
6 Although never causing nearly the scope of death and destruction as the so-called ‘city
buster’ bombs in London and Manchester in the 1990s, the Downing Street and
Heathrow mortar attacks were notorious more for the nature of the target than anything
else.
1
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1. Newry Police Station (February 28, 1985): The local unit and South
Armagh volunteers launched nine Mark 10 mortar shells from a
hijacked truck aimed at the RUC station in Corry Square, Newry. Eight
shells overshot the station, but one landed on a canteen, killing 9
policemen and injuring 37 other people.7
2. Downing Street Attacks (February 7, 1991): During British Cabinet
deliberations regarding the Gulf War, the PIRA fired three Mark 10
mortars from a specially-constructed opening in a van parked near
Downing Street, central London. One mortar hit a tree and detonated
several metres short of its target, shattering the blast windows in the
Cabinet Room, forming a wide crater in the gardens and severely
damaging Nos. 11 and 12 Downing Street. The other two shells did not
explode and were rendered safe.8 According to a law enforcement
source familiar with the attack, the mortars were actually quite
accurate–the only reason they missed the target was that the ranging
mark on the pavement that the attack team had made the previous day
had been washed away by snow, and the team had to estimate its
position on the day of the attack, resulting in a few metres’
discrepancy.9 Had this intervention by Mother Nature not occurred,
there might very well have been a direct hit on the Cabinet.
3. Heathrow Airport Attacks (March 8, 10 and 13, 1994): A PIRA team
fired three separate salvos of 4-5 Mark 6 mortars at Heathrow
Airport’s northern runway and Terminal Four building. One bomb
landed on the roof of Terminal Four, which had approximately 4,000
occupants at the time. None of the mortars exploded, perhaps because
the PIRA had not intended them to, but one widely-held opinion is
that they had been sabotaged by security forces or an informer.10
Nonetheless, the targeting of a facility in which a successful attack
could have caused thousands of civilian casualties represented one of
the most ambitious attacks by the PIRA up to this time and the fact

One of the former law enforcement officials remarked to the author that, although the
accuracy was reasonable, the attack was not quite as successful as often reported, since
only one of the eight mortars detonated. Author interview with former Northern Ireland
law enforcement official ‘C’.
8 Oppenheimer, Andy, 30 Years of IEDs: The Operational Art of the Provisional IRA,
PIRA–Lessons Learned Conference (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 17
April 2012).
9 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’.
10 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 424.
7
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that a second and third attack were possible despite increased security
caused embarrassment for authorities.11
Irrespective of casualties, all of these attacks had substantial psychological
impact (the raison d’être of genuine terrorism). This, together with the
casualties that were caused and the drastic improvements in the weapons
themselves, lends weight to a conclusion that, as a whole, the PIRA
successfully adopted the weapons technology of mortar systems. The
important questions are why and how they did this.

Decision
Evidence points towards the PIRA’s decision to develop mortars as being
driven by the perceived need to address a specific tactical performance
requirement. The Provisionals were confronted by a new challenge when
many of its prime targets in Northern Ireland, police stations and barracks,
began to be heavily fortified in the early 1970s.12 Initial attempts to
circumvent these defences consisted of catapulting petrol bombs from nearby
roofs and subsequently what is referred to as a ‘spigot grenade’,13 a container
of explosive with a lit fuse attached to the end of a dowel rod, which was fired
from a bow or shotgun. Needless to say, both of these approaches left a lot to
be desired in terms of safety and reliability and alternatives were sought.14 To
anyone familiar with weapons at the time, mortars were a logical choice in
order to overcome the physical hardening occurring around the PIRA’s
favoured target facilities, such as police stations, which usually consisted of
stronger perimeter fortifications but left the roofs of the facilities relatively
unprotected. In other words, the PIRA were driven to seek mortars by a
tactical need.15 Other tactical advantages of mortars included: a) providing a
standoff capability that would help shield their operators from detection;16
and b) the high ballistic arc of a mortar made it possible to fire on targets
fairly close to the launcher (at least when measured relative to other forms of

Oppenheimer, IRA, 232. The mortars had been concealed underground and were fired
from an area close to the perimeter fence.
12 Oppenheimer, IRA, 229.
13 Ibid., 228-229.
14 Ibid., 229.
15 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’. This was
yet another example of where, ‘Above all, necessity–and the constant need to improvise,
usually in covert and haphazard conditions–was the mother of IRA invention’
(Oppenheimer, IRA, xx).
16 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson, RAND, 16 May 2012.
11
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artillery)–or even above it–which at times could be useful in built-up urban
environments.17
The security countermeasures installed by the British could conceivably have
been dealt with in other ways, such as shifting to different targets, infiltrating
facilities, building bigger bombs or finding simpler methods of getting bombs
over the walls. Upon closer inspection, however, none of these alternatives
were really open to the PIRA of the early 1970s. Target shifting was not an
attractive option–the Provisionals were already trying to bring commercial
activity in Northern Ireland to a standstill through bombing city centres in
towns like Derry and Belfast and, at least in Northern Ireland, the PIRA did
not want to be seen to intentionally target civilians.18 Allowing the other focus
of their operations—British and Northern Ireland security forces–to retreat to
the safety of their bases was not a viable option under the PIRA’s strategy of
the time. Furthermore, while their bomb-making was becoming more
proficient and they were embarking on the production of home-made
explosives, the days of the ‘city destroyer’ bombs of the 1990s were far off and
it is doubtful whether the organization could have developed explosive
devices big enough–and stationed them close enough–to blast their way
through the fortifications. Last, simpler methods had failed to show much
promise: flare bombs were insufficient to cause much damage, the spigot
grenades were too dangerous, and hijacking aircraft to drop bombs on the
roofs of police stations was impractical on a large scale.19
With respect to the decision makers and the decision process, much of this
stemmed from the PIRA’s organizational structure. Organizationally, the
PIRA was something of a hybrid. On the one hand, at the time of its split with
the Official IRA in 1969, the PIRA theoretically inherited the well-defined,
traditional structure of Irish Republican militants, which was modelled
somewhat ironically on the British Army.20 Under this structure, supreme
authority on a daily basis rested in the Army Council, which directed a
General Headquarters (GHQ) consisting of ten specialist departments. On
the other hand, in practice, while overall strategy was laid out by the Army
Council, operational control was far more decentralized. Local units enjoyed
a high degree of autonomy in such factors as targeting and weapons
See Oppenheimer, IRA, 228 for a similar idea.
Jackson, Brian A. et al, Aptitude for Destruction-Vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational
Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 212.
19 O’Doherty recounts an episode when he volunteered to go up in a helicopter to
investigate whether it would be possible for explosives to be dropped on Strabane police
station (author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty).
20 English, Armed Struggle, 114; and Coogan, The IRA, 379.
17

18

15
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1501

Ackerman: The Provisional Irish Republican Army

employment.21 Therefore, the PIRA exhibited both top-down and bottom-up
decision-making.22
Yet, for a decision of the magnitude of whether or not to embark on a major
enterprise like the acquisition or development of mortars, decision making
likely took place at the center of the organization.23 In fact, O’Doherty
specifically mentions the development of mortars as one of the few decisions
that was centralized during his tenure with the organization in the early
1970s.24 It is therefore extremely probable that the final decision regarding
whether or not to acquire mortars, and whether to embark on an indigenous
development program, would have rested with the Army Council. It is quite
unlikely, however, that the Army Council would make a decision to adopt
mortars without some input from below. The most probable sources of such
input would be the department of the Quartermaster General (QMG) and the
Engineering Department. While the QMG would presumably have a greater
say in the case of externally acquired mortar systems and the Engineering
Department would predominate in discussions of internally developed
mortars, both departments would likely be heavily involved in providing
guidance and expert opinion to the Army Council (especially since the QMG
usually sat on the Army Council itself).
This somewhat bidirectional nature of decision making within the PIRA has
been confirmed by a former law enforcement official familiar with PIRA
command and control as being the most probable operationalization of the
mortar adoption decision. In this dynamic, bottom-up requirements and
suggestions would filter up through the hierarchy to the Army Council from
local units, and technical assessments of the feasibility of the endeavour
would be given by those with expertise in GHQ (especially the Quartermaster
and Engineering Departments).25 The Army Council would then make the
final decision in a top-down fashion and implement it through the Chief of
Staff and GHQ.26 Richard English has singled out the PIRA’s somewhat
flexible command and decision making structure–the “combination of high-

John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and
Functional Structure,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9:3 (1997): 23; Dillon, Martin,
The Dirty War (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 153; Toolis, Kevin, Rebel Hearts:
Journeys Within the IRA's Soul (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 319.
22 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’.
23 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’, Belfast,
Northern Ireland, 19 June 2012.
24 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty.
25 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’.
26 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement officials ‘A’ and ‘D’.
21
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level centralization with locally autonomous initiative”–as playing an
important role in the PIRA’s constant efforts to innovate.27
How did the decision to develop mortars relate to the PIRA’s overall tolerance
for risk? The PIRA at its inception was ready to engage in a variety of
different combat modes. The action orientation of young, ‘fired up’ recruits
made them quite willing to engage British and RUC (Royal Ulster
Constabulary) forces at close range in the streets.28 They were also willing to
experiment with explosives (with several cases that brought tragic results29).
Although the PIRA did calibrate its violence from time to time for political or
strategic reasons, it engaged in fairly risky behavior throughout its lifespan
(e.g., importing arms from Libya, using unwilling “human bombs”, and trying
to attack both Margaret Thatcher and the British Prime Minister’s residence
directly).
With respect to its overall planning horizon, even after the initial decision to
engage in the production of mortars and the production of the first relatively
successful variants, the PIRA persisted in further phases of mortar
development. It even substantially expanded the breadth of its R&D
program. For example, there were another eleven models after the Mark 6,
which was sufficiently reliable to be utilized in the high-profile 1994 attack on
Heathrow Airport twenty years after it was first deployed. The mortar
program thus represented an ongoing, long-term development effort, which
consisted of constantly attempting to increase the mortars’ effectiveness as
weapons and decrease the risk posed to their handlers. This long-term
thinking was most cogently expressed in reports of the PIRA encouraging
promising future technicians to remain in school in order to increase their
technical knowledge, as in the case of Danny McNamee, who became a
leading bomb-maker and was supported in his technical studies at Queen’s
University, Belfast, by the PIRA.30
Part of the reason for the length of the effort may have been that a degree of
momentum arose, similar to that which develops behind many long-term
development programs that are at least partially insulated from interference
by the leadership or enemy forces. Members of the mortar development
English, Richard, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA: (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 119.
28 Shane Paul O’Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former IRA Man's True Story, (Durham, CT:
Strategic Books Group, 2011), 60-61; Jackson et. al., “Provisional Irish Republican Army”
in Aptitude for Destruction, 100.
29 See, for example, Coogan, The IRA, 367.
30 Oppenheimer, IRA, 275-276.
27
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team, revelling in their technical prowess, may have been loath to cease
working on a challenging system that attracted a large amount of external
attention to the movement. However, there were doubtless external, in
addition to organizational, drivers of continued development. Offense and
defence in general establish a co-evolutionary dynamic that, from the PIRA’s
point of view, forced its ‘mortar offense’ to constantly adapt and grow in order
to cope with more robust defences, or in Oppenheimer’s words, “to keep the
authorities on the hop”.31 Larger, more penetrating mortars were required,
for instance, by further British hardening of military structures specifically
against mortars in the 1980s, including an empty top floor and a reinforced
roof of their bases.32 Desensitization33 of the media, the British enemy, and
even the group’s constituencies after multiple uses of the same weapon–some
mortars were used hundreds of times–might also have driven the leadership
to demand something new and extend the development program.

Implementation
The PIRA almost exclusively cultivated its mortars ‘in-house’, with the vast
majority of components and production occurring within the organization.
This was conducted mainly through its own institutional R&D organ, the
Engineering Department (ED) of the Army General Headquarters, with some
participation from certain highly dynamic local units, especially the South
Armagh Brigade. There was also some exploitation of existing commercial
networks in the use of widely available legitimate products as the basic raw
materials for mortars.
It is also unclear exactly where the expertise required for developing mortars
was acquired. It is known that the PIRA drew on many talented amateurs
(such as the Derry volunteers Shane Paul O’Doherty in the seventies and
Patrick Flood in the eighties) who rapidly became proficient in their bombmaking craft and were able to improvise extensively. It is also known that the
PIRA attracted a limited number of highly-skilled technical personnel,
including professional engineers.34 With respect to weapons-specific

Ibid., 292.
Urban, Mark, Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Faber &
Faber, 1992), 207; Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA
and British Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 94.
33 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism
and the Western News Media (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), 172.
34 In the 1980s, for example, the organization began to attract even more highlyspecialized individuals, such as Richard Johnson and Eamon McGuire, who had
backgrounds in electrical and aeronautical engineering (McGuire, Eamon, Enemy of the
31

32
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knowledge, there is evidence of early PIRA access to military manuals of
various armed forces,35 certain members with military experience, at least
some training by Libya,36 and even indications of transfer of military
knowledge from Russia and Germany during the first half of the 20th
century.37 It is thus likely that the expertise was derived from a kernel of
inherited knowledge that was built upon by trial-and-error, a hypothesis
borne out by the intense experimentation evident during the early period of
mortar development. As to the identity of the developers, directors of the
Engineering Department, like Frank McGuiness38 and Gabriel Cleary,39
probably had at least some involvement in the R&D process for mortars, while
some of those individuals most closely associated with mortar development
include Bernard Fox, Ciarain Chambers, and James ‘Mortar’ Monaghan.40 It
has also been revealed that for most of the period of development, the PIRA
stuck with more-or-less the same full-time R&D team, as evidenced by the
discovery of signature welding marks and initiation devices that were
consistent across various mortars.41
Interestingly, the mortars’ designers might not have even conceived of their
work as a structured development process at all, rather focusing on the next
project as merely an exercise in providing a weapon that met the
specifications that the operational personnel desired. However, more
decentralized local operatives were occasionally brought in to consult or to
help with testing.42
With respect to safety, while the organization as a whole did not want its
members harmed in the course of their duties, safety did not always seem to
be a high priority, especially in the early years. Many of the explosives used
were volatile and the designers did not include safety mechanisms in at least
Empire: Life as an International Undercover IRA Activist (Dublin: O'Brien Books,
2006)).
35 Oppenheimer, IRA, 242; author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty, Athlone,
Republic of Ireland, 20 June 2012.
36 Patrick Magee, one of the PIRA’s best-known bomb makers, allegedly went to Libya for
training in the 1970s (Oppenheimer, IRA, 263, 282; author interview with Shane Paul
O’Doherty).
37 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’, Belfast,
Northern Ireland, 19 June 2012.
38 Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 439.
39 O’Callaghan, Sean, The Informer (London: Corgi Books, 1999), 305.
40 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’; Horgan
and Taylor, “Provisional Irish Republican Army”, 14; Oppenheimer, IRA, 99, 281.
41 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’, Belfast,
Northern Ireland, 18 June 2012 and author interview with former Northern Ireland law
enforcement official ‘B’, Belfast, Northern Ireland, 18 June 2012.
42 Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty.
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the first five variants, resulting in ‘own goals’, such as the death of two PIRA
volunteers from the premature explosion of a Mark 3 mortar in 1973.43
However, much of the impetus for continuing to develop mortars after the
fairly successful Mark 6 was to improve safety. With respect to operational
security, the PIRA, for much of its operational lifespan, enjoyed some degree
of succor from supporters in rural areas of the Republic of Ireland and faced
Irish authorities that were not really equipped to pursue them, thus providing
the organization with a form of safe haven in the South. Thus, operational
security in these areas was less of an issue. However, in Northern Ireland and
England, they were under increasing security pressure, including infiltrators,
informers, and surveillance by a variety of British security forces (including
the British Army, the RUC and the Special Branch).44 This made security an
increasing priority and was one of the main reasons that most of the mortar
development had to take place in the Irish Republic.
Turning to the process by which the mortars were produced, Error! Reference
source not found. provides a detailed chronological account of the PIRA
development of mortars. There are, however, a few key points about the
production process in general that are not included in the table. First, there is
some uncertainty as to where the actual development of mortars took place
and whether this development was at a single or multiple locations. One
opinion is that the PIRA had a single ‘factory’ responsible for producing
mortars, but that the location of this factory changed from time to time.45
Reports of Irish police raids in the early 1970s, however, suggest that there
were different locations for different components, including a factory in
Dublin (discovered in 1975) that fabricated firing tubes and a light
engineering works in County Cavan (uncovered in 1976) where the mortar
shell casings were being manufactured.46 There are also reports that place
South Armagh as a hub of mortar building and testing activity in the 1970s.47
In 1988, the PIRA allegedly established a mortar bomb factory in Belfast
itself, in the Andersonstown area,48 and Tony Geraghty reports that in
December of the same year, the discovery of a PIRA bomb ‘factory’ in South
London revealed items associated with the manufacture of the Mark 10
O’Callaghan, The Informer, 84-85. This to some extent paralleled the wider safety
issues that the PIRA was having at the time when it came to dealing with explosives. For
example, in June 1970 much of Derry’s PIRA leadership (together with two children)
were killed while constructing bombs in a kitchen (Toolis, Rebel Hearts, 304).
44 Dillon, Martin, The Dirty War (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990).
45 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘C’.
46 Oppenheimer, IRA, 170.
47 Harnden, Toby, Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh (London: Coronet Books,
2000), 233.
48 Dillon, The Dirty War, 292.
43
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mortar, indicating that some mortar production might even have been
occurring outside of Ireland.49 One might speculate that during the initial
period, mortar development took place mainly in the Republic of Ireland (and
some Republican strongholds like South Armagh), but that as the PIRA’s
production capabilities matured and the number of mortars sought increased,
production locations multiplied and became more local to their places of
intended use.
Second, with respect to the explosive components of the mortars, explosives
used as the main charge in mortars could generally be sourced from almost
the entire range of the PIRA’s prodigious arsenal of explosives types,50
although lighter charges, and hence more powerful ‘high’ explosives, were
probably preferred in most mortars to meet the exigencies of aerodynamics.
This was made easier after the PIRA received large quantities of Semtex high
explosive from Libya in the mid-1980s. Trigger, timing, and power units for
the mortar systems could similarly be drawn from the extensive broader PIRA
inventories and expertise in these areas.51 The propellant used to launch the
mortar was a different matter entirely. This had to be carefully formulated to
achieve a safe and reliable launch, imparting a relatively steady explosive
force to the mortar shell in order to ensure a consistent range. Error! Reference
source not found. traces the evolution of propellants, from early reliance on
commercially available shotgun and related powder cartridges, through the Jcloth,52 to the more sophisticated purpose-built and precisely measured
propellants that formed part of the weapon itself.
Third, construction of the non-explosive components of the mortar showed
just as much ingenuity. Early seizures of mortars, like that in 1974, informed
the security forces that components such as the housing were being
manufactured in a facility containing at least a metal lathe and heavy welding
equipment, akin to a light engineering workshop.53 The aforementioned raids
of PIRA mortar production facilities in 1974 and 1975 indicated an incipient

Geraghty, Tony, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British
Intelligence (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 192.
50 When supplies of commercial explosives like gelignite became scarce during the first
phase of mortar development, specialist units in the PIRA focused on the manufacture of
home-made explosives and developed multiple recipes, mostly based on various
compounds containing ammonium nitrate fertilizer. See, among others, Jackson,
Aptitude for Destruction, 99; and O’Callaghan, The Informer, 89.
51 For an extensive discussion, see Oppenheimer, “Chapter X,” in IRA.
52 This propellant was apparently made by soaking an absorbent cleaning cloth – typically
of the “J-Cloth” brand – in a sodium chlorate solution. See Geraghty, The Irish War, 189.
53 Ibid., 170.
49
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light industrial capacity,54 which undoubtedly grew as the larger mortar
models were developed to the point where Oppenheimer characterizes this
capability as having a production line quality.55 Many of the raw materials for
mortar components were sourced from commercially available pipes and gas
cylinders, thus minimizing the amount of machine tooling required.
The path to developing a robust mortar capability did not proceed without
incident, however. The PIRA experienced several difficulties and setbacks,
which can also be gleaned from a close look at Error! Reference source not
found.. The accuracy of many of the models was poor, not only of the earlier
attempts, but sometimes (as with the Marks 7, 8, and 9) accuracy was
knowingly traded for greater explosive power. Another major problem was
the safety of the initial devices, as mentioned above. Compounding safety and
accuracy issues was a lack of detonation reliability–many of the mortars, even
if they did not blow up on launch or hit the wrong target, failed to detonate
upon impacting the intended target. Nonetheless, the PIRA’s technicians
persevered with the development of mortars and were eventually successful in
addressing many of the problems of safety and reliability through a number of
ingenious advances, from impeller-operated arming mechanisms to
sophisticated timers and triggers. Although accuracy presented a perennial
problem, even this improved markedly. For example, according to a former
Northern Ireland law enforcement official, in the 1985 attack on the Newry
Police Station, the landing locations of the several mortars used were closely
grouped, indicating a fair amount of accuracy and reliability in ballistic
trajectory.56 These achievements were all the more remarkable when one
considers that over the entire period of development, the PIRA was under
intense security pressures.

Analysis
The basic tactical need underlying the decision to adopt mortars has been
detailed above. Yet, the key question in this regard is why the PIRA decided
to produce this capability themselves, rather than, for example, procuring
mortars on international arms markets. Reasons for taking on this complex
engineering task include the following:


Difficulties Associated with External Acquisition: The PIRA sourced
many of its weapons through patronage (primarily through the

Ibid.
Author interview with Andy Oppenheimer, London, England, 22 June 2012.
56 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’.
54
55
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largesse of Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi and Irish-American
sympathizers in the United States)57 and exploitation (such as
purchasing arms from third party suppliers or stealing detonators
from commercial quarries), but these sources presented certain
disadvantages for more sophisticated weapons like mortars. First of
all, the basic purchase of weapons systems on the open market can be
expensive, and can open the organization’s activities up to interdiction
or infiltration by security forces which can simply monitor known
arms suppliers, not to mention the additional resource costs and risks
associated with transporting, storing and maintaining purchased
arms.58 While the IRA had a steady funding stream for most of its
existence, especially in the early years this funding was limited.
Moreover, several of the organization’s attempts to import arms,
whether from purchases or overseas patrons, were interdicted in the
1970s and 1980s, with notable examples being seizures of weapons at
Schipol Airport (1971) and on the ships, the Claudia (1973), the Marita
Ann (1984) and the Eksund (1987).59 Some reports list mortars among
the seized weapons,60 but it can be inferred that, while the
organization’s officers might have attempted to include externallysourced mortars in large arms consignments at various times, these
attempts were not successful, since this type of mortar was never used
by the PIRA. Furthermore, a former law enforcement official has
stated that the PIRA never procured commercially available mortars.61
Possessing an internal production capability would obviate many of
these risks, because large numbers of mortars did not need to be
stored, but could be manufactured as needed. Also, any interdictions
of mortars would not negate the knowledge of how to build new ones
in the future,62 and necessary components could be purchased
legitimately – and more cheaply – than military mortars.63


Specific Tactical Requirements: The PIRA had usage requirements
that differed substantially from military mortars. While military
mortars were designed for fairly long ranges (~5,000m), to have the

Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 8-12; Dillon, Dirty Wars, 396.
Oppenheimer, IRA, 150.
59 Coogan, The IRA, 432; Keith Craig and Ian Geldard, IRA, INLA: Foreign Support and
International Connections (Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1988); Toolis, Rebel
Hearts, 67; Maloney, 3-8.
60 Ibid., 171 and Dillon, Dirty Wars, 399, for example, mention mortars amongst the
weapons seized by Belgian customs officers in 1977.
61 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘B’.
62 Personal correspondence with Dr. Brian Jackson.
63 Oppenheimer, IRA, 150.
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firer present upon launch and to be used numerous times, the nature
of the PIRA’s covert terrorist campaign meant that it required mortars
operative over shorter ranges (within the confines of a city), with
options to fire remotely and where the launcher was generally
abandoned after a single use.64 Moreover, military mortars required
expertise and practice to aim correctly and achieve desired accuracy;
the PIRA volunteers launching mortars from the back of a van and
aiming in the general direction of a police station were operating
under different functional constraints.65 Producing its own mortars
would thus allow the PIRA to customize weapons for its own purposes.


Deficit of Trust in Externally Sourced Materials: As the conflict in
Northern Ireland wore on, there were increasing cases of British or
RUC counterintelligence personnel ‘doctoring’ or otherwise sabotaging
PIRA weapons–including guns with built-in surveillance devices or
explosives that would not detonate.66 This led to PIRA engineers
having decreased confidence in externally-sourced materiel and
provided an additional impetus to produce those weapons internally
when it could.



DIY Prestige: In addition to the purely tactical advantages of
particular weapons, there were also the symbolic messages that would
be tacitly conveyed by the use of a particularly sophisticated weapon.
It is reported that at all levels of the PIRA, from the organization as a
whole to individual units, there was often the desire to show various
audiences, whether it was the British, its Catholic constituency, or even
other brigades in the PIRA, how ingenious, capable, and terrifying the
PIRA could be–an indigenous mortar capability would thus bestow
propaganda benefits on its developers.67



Technical Confidence and Constituencies: The PIRA possessed one of
the most mature, highly-skilled, and productive research and
development organs in the annals of violent non-state organizations,
the so-called Engineering Department. The ED’s committed and
cunning senior technicians were responsible for numerous
breakthroughs in the arts and instruments of clandestine war against
the state and enjoyed a substantial level of influence as the PIRA’s

Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’.
Ibid.
66 See Dillon, The Dirty War, 229 for examples.
67 Oppenheimer, IRA, 257.
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elite.68 Their early successes with explosives mixtures in the 1970s
(following some initial missteps in this regard) might have given them
(and the PIRA’s senior command) the confidence that they could take
on the difficult task of developing an effective mortar capability. Even
if this confidence had been lacking among members of the Army
Council or other senior leadership, the ED enjoyed a degree of
independence from frontline operations,69 and the decision to engage
in the development and production of mortars may have been the
PIRA leadership’s way of “letting the movement's better technical
intellects have their experiments”.70 The subsequent history of the
organization certainly presents many examples of highly educated and
skilled individuals being given more or less free rein to develop or
acquire new weapons technologies.71


Weapon Evolution: Indigenous development allowed for the PIRA’s
mortar capability to evolve over time, and adapt to new requirements
and developments, whereas if mortars were externally sourced, a new
product would have to be identified, possibly necessitating the
development of a relationship with a different supplier and the
locating of new transport channels.

There were thus several synergistic factors pushing the PIRA in the direction
of putting the time, resources, and effort into developing their own mortar
systems. While indigenous production might have been overdetermined, and
it is difficult to say whether any single one of these factors would have been
sufficient to encourage the organization to move in this direction, the specific
tactical requirements and lack of trust in external sources of weapons both
provided strong incentives to develop mortars internally.
We can now turn to examine the key determinants of the PIRA’s success in
this regard. After a thorough analysis of the context surrounding the PIRA’s
development of mortars, three interrelated factors stand out as most salient.
The first factor stems from the PIRA’s organizational and individual expertise
and access to required materials. The PIRA inherited a lot of latent
Horgan and Taylor, Provisional Irish Republican Army, 14.
Oppenheimer, IRA, 280.
70 Urban, Big Boys' Rules, 210.
71 One of the more well-known examples is that of the so-called ‘Boston Three’ (actually
five scientists, including an aeronautical engineer, a computer scientist and someone with
high-level U.S. security clearance) who set about developing a guided missile system in
the United States with the aim of being able to shoot down British aircraft (primarily
helicopters) in Northern Ireland – see McGuire, Enemy of the Empire, 211-212; 25.
68
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knowledge from before the 1969 split, which meant that the organization did
not have to start from scratch, so to speak, either technically or
organizationally and, although it was strapped for weapons and other
resources in 1970, it was able to build on its legacy capabilities to quickly
reconstitute its expertise and access to resources. In addition, the socioeconomic background of its membership ended up serving it well in the area
of weapons development. The majority of its members were working-class
Catholics, who while not necessarily possessing the technical skills for
weapons development, brought with them a basic inventiveness, creativity,
and ‘working men’s skillsets’ like machining and welding. In addition to the
direct value of such experience in the fabrication of mortars, this background
quickly allowed the organization to develop a high level of practical skill–
something that was essential for solving the obstacles encountered in
developing improvised weapons. At the same time, the appeal of the PIRA
was sufficiently broad that the organization was able to attract the services of
a small number of highly-trained individuals, including engineers, chemists,
and computer scientists to provide the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics,
timing systems, and so forth. There was also an organizational structure that
was set up to promote and implement innovation from the very beginning.
The embodiment of this institutionalization of R&D, the Engineering
Department was somewhat isolated and protected from frontline operations,
which allowed for the possibility of long-term R&D projects like mortars. At
the same time, the organization also made room for local EOs (explosives
officers) in the various towns in the North to react to local conditions and
independently engage in local-level innovation, which could then filter back to
the center.72
The second major contributor to success was its access to safe havens. The
existence of a large area in the Republic of Ireland in which to conduct
research, production, and testing that was beyond the reach of British
authorities has been identified as a key element in the success of the PIRA’s
mortar program.73
Last was the PIRA’s culture of learning. In the area of weapons development,
the PIRA displayed an aptitude for learning that is unrivalled among terrorist
groups. The first form of learning it engaged in was pre-employment testing
of weapons systems. O’Callaghan describes firing mortars with dummy shells
For instance, Shane Paul O’Doherty–at the time the local Derry EO–who had a
reputation for inventiveness was asked to come down South to consult with engineers
who were developing the early mortars. Author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty.
73 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘A’.
72
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at Inch Strand on the inner side of the Dingle Peninsula, where the shells
would land undamaged on the sandy beach,74 while O’Doherty describes
visiting a farm in Kildare in 1972 where mortars were tested for range and
weight-bearing capability.75 The second aspect of the culture of learning was
the willingness and institutionalization of post-operation analysis. When
things went wrong with an attack, the operatives conducting the attack would
be debriefed by superiors. Of course, ‘own goals’ (where the PIRA operatives
were themselves killed) made it very difficult to identify the source of the
failure.76 After-action reporting did not only occur when missions went
awry–this practice was so pervasive that it has been described as ‘debrief–
win, lose or draw’.77 While the PIRA was unable to perform technical analyses
of successful attacks or even observable failures (since the mortars or their
remnants would be within the control of the authorities), they did the next
best thing, by sending observers to stand at police cordons and try to gather
as much information about the effects of the attack or the unexploded
ordinance as possible.78 This commitment to constant learning and
improvement was a powerful enabler of the rapid development and success of
the mortar program.
The sustained development of mortars, which included all system
components, from the casing and the propellant to the warhead and the
trigger mechanisms, undoubtedly constituted a prime example of complex
engineering by a terrorist organization. This was born out of tactical necessity
but enabled by good organizational practices and access to materials,
expertise, and places in which to leverage these. As Oppenheimer contends,
“…it was in the series of homemade mortars produced by the IRA that its
ingenuity was revealed, and its ability to supplement imported war-fighting
equipment by developing its own.”79

O’Callaghan, The Informer, 86.
O’Doherty recalls that on one occasion, the mortar shell ‘went so far and buried itself
underground that they couldn’t find it’–author interview with Shane Paul O’Doherty.
76 “Bombers,” Stirling Film Television Productions, 2012, available at:
http://www.stirlingtelevision.co.uk/factual/bombers.html.
77 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement official ‘D’.
78 Author interview with former Northern Ireland law enforcement officials ‘B’ and ‘C’.
79 Oppenheimer, IRA, 227.
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Appendix A: PIRA Mortar Development
Relevant Period

Prior
to
1972

19721974

No Capability

Intense
Experimentation

Designation

‘Spigot
Grenade’80

Flare
‘Mortar’81

Mark 182

Date First
Aware

Range

Early
1970s

1973

June 1972

Payload

2 kg gelignite

‘flew far’

‘limited’ amount of
PETN

250g commercial
plastic explosive

Other Salient
Characters
- 15 cm pipe.
- Fired from
shotgun.

- ‘Proto-mortar’
using marine
flares.
- Replaced flare
material with
detonator,
explosive and a
fuse.
- Mortar made up
of 50mm copper
pipe, with
.303 cartridge in
rear as propellant.
- Triggered by
driving spike
against .22
cartridge
(probably nail
gun-type ‘Hilti’
cartridge) to
ignite detonator.
- Described as
having an

Notable Associated
Attacks

Notes
- Developed to deal
with fortified
police stations.
- Viewed as too
dangerous for
volunteers to use.

- Was not used
beyond the town of
Derry.

- Would spin once
took off.
- No safety
mechanism, so it
was dangerous to
user.
- Failed to explode
if fuse damaged by
impact at wrong
angle.

Oppenheimer, IRA, 229.
Author interview with Shane Paul O'Doherty.
82 Author interview with Shane Paul O'Doherty; Geraghty, The Irish War, 88; Oppenheimer, IRA, 229.
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Mark 283

1 kg commercial
explosive

December
1972

250m
Mark 384

1973

0.5 kg high-grade
crystalline
ammonium nitrate,
boosted by
aluminum powder

ingenious nosecone fuse design.
- 20cm long,
57mm diameter
steel pipe.
- 12-gauge
shotgun cartridge
as propellant.
- 5 second delay
from impact to
ignition from a
split fuse.
- Modified, more
reliable nose cone.
- 60mm mortar
barrel; static
firing pin and
Hilti cartridge as
detonator; ‘Jcloth’ (sodium
chlorate-soaked)
used as a
propellant.
- Accuracy
increased through
use of stronger
base plate and
configurable
aiming quadrant.
- Cut main
explosive charge

- First PIRA mortar
fatality: British
soldier attempting
to defuse wayward
mortar fired in Turf
Lodge, Belfast in
December 1972.

- Attacks on
Creggan Camp,
Derry and Lisanelly
barracks, Omagh in
1973 (16 mortars).
- Failed attack on
RUC Pomeroy
barracks in August
1973 resulted in two
IRA men killed.

- Often fired
through the roof of
the target building.
- Used 25 times in
its first four
months.
- Accuracy still
poor because of
movement of the
base-plate.

- Highly volatile
explosive tended to
explode
prematurely.
- Unreliable, given
to tumbling in
flight.
- Accuracy within
30m over 300m.
- Used 105 times in
14 separate attacks
in first six months.

Malcolm Sutton, “CAIN Database of Deaths,” December 10, 1972, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1972.html; Horgan and Gill,
From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, 11; Oppenheimer, IRA, 229.
84 Geraghty, The Irish War, 189; John Horgan and Paul Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker: A Social Network Analysis Model of the SocioPsychological and Cultural Dynamics of the IED Process, A Report Prepared for the Office of Naval Research supported by Grant PAGEN0001409-1-0667 (University Park, PA: International Center for the Study of Terrorism, forthcoming), p.11; Ryder ,Chris, A Special Kind of Courage: 321
Squadron – Battling the Bombers (London: Methuen, 2006), 215; Author interview with Shane Paul O'Doherty; Oppenheimer, IRA, 229-230.
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Mark 485

Mark 586

Mark 687

1974

1974

1974

400m

0.45 kg ammonium
nitrate, with up to
15% aluminum
powder

25m

1,097m

1.36 kg explosive
charge (often
Semtex), detonated
by .22 cartridge on
impact

by half from
previous model.
- Extended range
version of Mark 3.
- Used greater
amount of J-cloth
as the propellant.
- Contained ball
bearings
- No safety
mechanism, so
used as a
traditional
military mortar.

- Attack on base at
Strabane (14
mortars did not
function).

- ‘Bombard’-like.

- Never used.

- 60mm calibre.
- Standard launch
tube, strong base
plate and bipod.
- .22 calibre
cartridge initiated
homemade
gunpowder
propellant after
dropping mortar
shell down tube.
- Contained an
impeller to arm
itself during flight
(advanced

- Cross-border
attack on County
Armaugh army
observation post in
1974.
- Extensive damage
caused when
thrown by hand
onto roof of
armoured vehicle in
Divis Flats, Belfast
in 1987.
- 1994 Heathrow
attacks.

- Dangerous: could
explode in tube
and had no safety
mechanism.
- Was abandoned
in six months.

- Discovered
during raid on IRA
workshop in
Antrim in 1974.
- First reliable
device (much safer
and longer range
minimized risk of
detection).
- Warheads in
Heathrow attacks
made from
drainpipes with
tailfins.
- 28 intact units
found in Belfast
bakery in 1974;
allowed security
forces to gain

Horgan and Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, 11-12; Geraghty, The Irish War, 189; Oppenheimer, IRA, 231.
Geraghty, The Irish War, 190; Oppenheimer, IRA, 231.
87 Geraghty, The Irish War, 191; Andy Oppenheimer, 30 Years of IEDs: The Operational Art of the Provisional IRA, PIRA–Lessons Learned
Conference (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 17 April 2012); Oppenheimer, IRA, 170, 231-232.
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technology).
- 8 aluminum fins.
- Electric trigger
system using
remote control
technology.

19751987

Approaching
Military Grade

Mark 788

Mark 889

Mark

990

1976

1976

1976

> Mark 6

> Mark 6

5 kg explosive

- Longer version
of Mark 6 (1m
tube).

- Longer version
of Mark 6 (1m
tube).
- ‘Cannibalized’
version of earlier
models.
- Produced from
cut-down gas
cylinders, so
shorter, fatter
profile.
- Could be
launched in
groups of up to 10
tubes.

intimate working
knowledge.

- Used against
Army-RUC base at
Crossmaglen in
1976.

- Poor flight
stability because of
length.
- Sacrificed
accuracy for
greater payload.
- Poor flight
stability.
- Less
sophisticated.

- October 1976
attack on
Crossmaglen base;
7 mortars
detonated.
- 1977: 5 warheads
off target landed in
school grounds in
Belfast.

- Sacrificed
accuracy for
explosive payload.

Oppenheimer, IRA, 233.
Ibid.
90 Ibid., 234.
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Mark 1091

19881998

Bigger and
Better

Mark 1192

1979

1989

300m

519m

Variously reported as
11kg (Boyne and
Horgan) and 20kg100kg (Geraghty and
Oppenheimer) of
explosive (1991
attack used “ANNIE”
ammonium nitrate
and nitrobenzene
mix; sometimes
Semtex)

10 kg (often ANNIE)

- 150 mm
diameter, 1.2m
long warhead
made from gas
cylinders.
- Fine black
powder as
propellant in base
allowed accurate
ranging.
- Incorporated
safety pin and
weight-based
safety mechanism
with detonation
on impact.
- Detonated by
electrical timers.
- Multiple (up to
10) launch tubes
(‘set at varying
angles for
maximum target
coverage’ Oppenheimer, p.
234).

- First fatality
caused by mortar
attack in South
Armagh in March
1979.
- Corry Square
Police Station,
Newry attack April 1980.
- 1985 Newry police
station attack (9
killed).
- Used in 1991
attack on British
Cabinet on
Downing Street.

- Often launched
from the back of a
truck.
- Incorporated
incendiary in
base/launchers to
destroy forensic
evidence after
launch.
- Became
‘workhorse’ of
mortar arsenal
during 1980s, but
‘wide angles’ of
attack meant that
chances of civilian
injury still high.

- Used in May 1989
against a British
Army observation
post in
Glassdrumman,
South Armagh.

Ibid, 193, 234-235, 320-321; Horgan and Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, 11-14; Geraghty, The Irish War, 192-195; Sean Boyne, “Uncovering
the Irish Republican Army: Weapons,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 August 1996, available at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/weapons.html, 3; Toolis, Rebel Hearts, 52.
92 Geraghty, The Irish War, 192; Horgan and Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, 11-14; Oppenheimer, IRA, 236.
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(Mark 1293)

1989

Mark 1394

1990

Mark 1495

1992

Mark 1596

1992

2.5 kg Semtex

35m

36 kg

20 kg of home-made
explosive

100-275m
(depending
on version)

70-75 kg of
ammonium nitrate

- Not actually a
mortar, since
utilized direct fire
from a horizontal
position.
- 75cm long.
- Inertia fuse and
triggered by
command wire or
timer.
- Employed a
shaped charge to
pierce armour.
- Made from 45gallon oil drum.
- Launched from a
spigot.
- Short range
meant required
truck or tractor as
a launching pad.
- Made from top
halves of two gas
cylinders welded
together.
- 360mm
diameter cylinder.
- Tube was 3
metres long.
- Included coins
as shrapnel.

- Attack on
Crossmaglen,
October 1989.

- Ostensibly made
British armoured
vehicles obsolete.

- First used in
attack on
Dungannon, May
1990.

- Sometimes used
diesel fuel tanks as
projectiles.

- May 1992 attack
on Crossmaglen
base.
- Army base in
Ballygawley,
County Tyrone,
December 1992.
- British base in
Osnabruck,
Germany in June
1996.

- ‘Barrack buster’.
- Brought down
British helicopters
in March, July
1994.
- Improvised from
widely available
gas cylinder used

Author interview with Jim Cusack; Horgan and Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, pp.11-14; Oppenheimer, IRA, 236.
Oppenheimer, IRA, 237.
95 Ibid., 237; Horgan and Gill, From Bomb to Bomb-Maker, 11-14.
96 Geraghty, The Irish War, 193; Oppenheimer, IRA, 187, 238; Harnden, Bandit Country, 398.
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for cooking /
heating.

97
98

(Mark 1697)

1993

Mark 1798

1994-1995

Effective
20-25m, up
to 200m

900g Semtex

- Horizontal,
direct fire weapon
(like Mark 12).
- Small and
lightweight, no
anchoring of base
plate required
(could be shoulder
launched).
- Shaped charge.
- Described as one
of the PIRA's most
destructive
weapons.

- July 1993 attack
on William Street,
Derry.

- Never used.

- Sometimes
launched from
under bonnet of
car.
- Unlike Mark 12,
made from easily
acquired parts with
minimal
machining needed.
- Built during mid1990s ceasefire.

Oppenheimer, IRA, 238.
Boyne, “Uncovering the Irish Republican Army: Weapons.”
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